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Section 351 in Acquisitive
Reorganizations: Cutting the
Giant Down to Size
Leon Gabinet*
Several years ago, section 351 was deemed the sleeping giant of Subchapter C
when the IRS seemingly legitimized use of that section in acquisitive reorganizations
to achieve tax-free treatmentfrom someparties in an otherwise taxable transaction.
However, in 1980, in a direct about-face, the IRS came to view the section 351 ex-
change and the acquisitive segment as integral steps of a taxable reorganization. As
a result, allparties to the transaction were forced to recognize gain. Instead of the
tortured construction of section 351 advanced by the IRS, the author contends that
interdependence should not be imposed where those steps taken serve one or more
parties' specfFc needs which would not be satisfied by recharacterizing the transac-
tion, Alternatively, the author suggests that section 269 is ideally suited to remedy
abuses of section 351, while properly acknowledging the separate and independent
significance of each segment of the transaction.
INTRODUCTION
SEVERAL YEARS AGO, a number of resourceful tax practi-
tioners developed and began to employ an acquisition tech-
nique using Internal Revenue Code section 3511 to achieve tax-
free treatment for some shareholders of a target corporation in a
transaction which otherwise would have been taxable.2 A classic
example of this technique is detailed in the now celebrated Letter
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Ph.B., Uni-
versity of Chicago (1950); J.D., University of Chicago (1953).
1. I.R.C. § 351 (1976). This section provides for nonrecognition of gain on the trans-
fer of assets to a corporation solely in exchange for stock or securities of the corporation,
provided that the transferor or transferors are in control of the corporation immediately
after the exchange. Id. "Control" for this purpose is defined as possessing at least 80% of
the total voting power and at least 80% of the total number of nonvoting shares. Id.
§ 368(c) (1976).
2. See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
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Ruling in the National Starch transaction (National Starch) which
deals with the acquisition of National Starch and Chemical Com-
pany by Unilever, U.S.3
National Starch was a publicly held corporation with a 14%
minority interest owned by A and his wife.4 Unilever wished to
acquire the target company's stock and continue the target's busi-
ness in a subsidiary. Apparently, Unilever was prepared to pay
cash for the stock in order to set the stage for a step-up in basis of
the target assets under section 334(b)(2).5 A, being of advanced
age, wished to avoid a taxable transaction which would require
him to recognize gain from the sale of his 14% interest during his
lifetime. Because the planners considered A's acquiescence neces-
sary, they were faced with the problem of reconciling A's desire
for nonrecognition of gain with Unilever's objective of acquiring
the target's stock by purchase.
Some practitioners describe the methods used to achieve these
apparently irreconcilable objectives as "Forced B reorganization
and vertical double dummy techniques," coupled with a section
351 exchange.6 This translates into the following series of steps:
(1) The parent company (P) organizes a new corporation
(NEWCO) which, in turn, organizes a new, wholly-owned
and minimally capitalized subsidiary (S). P then transfers
cash to NEWCO in exchange for all of its common stock
while A transfers target (T) stock in exchange for NEWCO
nonvoting, cumulative preferred stock. P transfers suffi-
cient cash to purchase the target stock from the public
shareholders.
(2) Merging S into T, T's public shareholders receive cash from
S while S stock held by NEWCO is converted to T stock
under the state merger law.7
(3) NEWCO thus emerges with all of the target stock.8
In the National Starch ruling, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) placed its imprimatur upon this acquisition technique.
First, it found that the creation of NEWCO and the subsequent
3. Private Letter Ruling 7839060, June 28, 1978, I.R.S. LErrER RULINGs REPoRTS
(CCH) No. 83 (Oct. 4, 1978).
4. Id.
5. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976). This section provides for the step-up in basis of assets
acquired upon liquidation of a subsidiary, if the acquisition of the subsidiary's stock and its
subsequent liquidation is accomplished within a specified period of time. Id. The step-up
in basis to the amount paid for the stock reflects the fact that the stock acquisition and
liquidation constitute a purchase of the assets.
6. Bowen, Corporate Acquisition Techniques, 32 U. oF S. CAL. TAX INST. 1, 22 (1980).
7. Private Letter Ruling 7839060, supra note 3.
8. Id.
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transfer of cash by P for NEWCO common stock, as well as the
transfer by A of T stock for NEWCO preferred shares, constituted
a tax-free exchange under section 351. Second, it disregarded the
creation of S and its merger into T pursuant to Revenue Ruling
73-427, 9 and treated NEWCO as having purchased for cash all of
the publicly held T stock." Thus, A achieved a tax-free exchange,
while the cash purchase of publicly held T stock set the stage for a
step-up in basis of T's assets under section 334(b)(2) if later
liquidated. " I
Clearly, the key step in this acquisition technique is the adroit
interposition of the section 351 exchange. Its successful use in Na-
tional Starch was hailed by many writers as the dawning of a new
age for section 351. Indeed, one writer was moved to say that
"[s]ection 351 is truly the sleeping giant of Subchapter C. Its time
has come."' 2 It was suggested that the basic procedure employed
in National Starch could accomplish acquisition objectives other-
wise precluded by local law. Precisely such a technique was ad-
dressed in Letter Ruling 7849012,13 where the target, an insurance
company, could not be acquired in an ordinary triangular merger
under local law. Instead, the target's shareholders exchanged their
shares for stock in a newly formed holding company in a tax-free
section 351 exchange." Subsequently, merging the holding com-
pany into the acquiring corporation's subsidiary accomplished in-
directly that which could not have been accomplished directly in a
"(B)" or "(C)" reorganization.' 5
In an even more exotic use of section 351, shareholders of an
operating company (OPCO) could establish a holding company
9. 1973-2 C.B. 301.
10. Private Letter Ruling 7839060, supra note 3.
11. Note that the IRS elected to reserve judgment on the consequences of a liquida-
tion of the target into NEWCO:
[NEWCO] has no plan or intention to liquidate [Target] but [NEWCO] may...
study... whether [such a liquidation] would be advantageous... during the
two year period following [the] acquisition .... Even if... such a liquidation
may be desirable [NEWCO] will not so liquidate [Target] unless a ruling shall
have been obtained from the... Service to the effect that such liquidation does
not affect the rulings requested in connection with [A's transfer of Target stock to
NEWCO in exchange for NEWCO preferred stock]. Id.
12. Greenberg, The Use of Holding Companies to Obtain Tax Advantages, 57 TAXES
847, 856 (1979).
13. Private Letter Ruling 7849012, June 28, 1978, I.R.S. LETTER RULINGS REPORTS
(CCH) No. 93 (Dec. 12, 1978).
14. Id.
15. Greenberg, supra note 12, at 855.
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(H) and acquire all its shares in exchange for OPCO stock. 6
Next, the holding company borrows a large sum from a bank.
The loan proceeds could be distributed tax-free to H's sharehold-
ers since H has no earnings and profits to cover the distribution. 7
Intercorporate dividends paid by OPCO to its holding company
parent would ultimately be used to repay the loan, and would be
essentially nontaxable under the section 243 intercorporate divi-
dend deduction.' The possibilities seemed endless.
In 1980, these fond hopes for section 351 were dealt a severe
blow. In Revenue Ruling 80-284,19 the IRS reviewed a fact pat-
tern strikingly similar to that described in National Starch. Again,
an acquiring parent sought to purchase all the shares of a target,
86% of which was publicly held and 14% of which was held by A.
Shareholder A, well along in years, had a low basis in his stock,
and did not want a taxable transaction. The acquiring parent
wanted to structure the acquisition so as to permit a step-up in
basis of the target's assets. The acquisition scheme followed in
National Starch seemed the obvious answer. Transfer of A's tar-
get stock to a newly formed holding company (H) in exchange for
its preferred shares, in conjunction with the acquiring parent's
transfer of cash for all of H's common stock, would constitute the
tax-free segment of the transaction under section 351. Then, H
would organize a subsidiary which would be merged into the tar-
get.20 T's nondissenting public shareholders would receive cash
and H would emerge with all T's shares. Under Revenue Ruling
73-427 the transitory subsidiary merger into T would be disre-
garded and the IRS would treat the acquisition of the publicly
held shares as a purchase.2' A subsequent liquidation of the tar-
get into the holding company would result in a step-up in basis of
the assets under section 334(b)(2).22
Notwithstanding the obvious and almost perfect congruence of
the two factual patterns, the IRS refused to apply the ruling in
16. Technical Advice Memorandum 7841012, undated, I.R.S. LETrER RULINGS RE-
PORTS (CCH) No. 85 (Oct. 17, 1978), noted in Greenberg, supra note 12, at 847-48.
17. Greenberg, supra note 12, at 848. The Code defines a dividend as a distribution of
property made out of accumulated or current earnings and profits. I.R.C. § 316 (1976).
18. Greenberg, supra note 12, at 848. I.R.C. § 243 (1976) provides that in the case of a
corporation there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to specified percentages
of the amount received as dividends from a domestic corporation which is subject to
taxation.
19. 1980-2 C.B. 117.
20. Id.
21. Id. 1973-2 C.B. 301.
22. Id. See supra note 5.
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National Starch. Revenue Ruling 80-284 sent shock waves
through the tax community by viewing the section 351 exchange
and the purchase segment as integral parts of a larger transaction
following a "pattern common to acquisitive reorganizations.
23
Here, however, the acquisition was not tax-free. Since 86% of the
consideration for target stock was cash, the judicial requirement of
"continuity of interest" was not satisfied.24 This concept requires
a substantial portion of the consideration for surrendered shares
to be in the form of "equity" in order to qualify for nonrecogni-
tion treatment under the reorganization rules. 25 Thus, the larger
overall transaction is viewed as a taxable reorganization, eclipsing
the purported section 351 exchange. Characterized as a sale, the
transaction results in recognized gain by all of the target share-
holders. Since the section 351 exchange is deemed an integral part
of the larger sale transaction, and does not apply to transactions
which are essentially sales rather than mere changes in form of
ownership, it cannot be employed to grant nonrecognition treat-
ment to a particular facet of an integrated sale transaction. Ac-
cording to Revenue Ruling 80-284, no other result is consistent
with the history and purpose of the continuity of interest doctrine
as expressed in a series of landmark decisions.
26
The use of a section 351 exchange in connection with a trans-
action otherwise taxable because of lack of continuity of interest
does violence to the traditional continuity of interest requirement,
particularly where the two transactions are appropriately viewed
as interdependent and therefore integratable segments of a single,
taxable sale. Existence of a prearranged plan and the logic of the
entire procedure suggests the separate segments are integratable,
so that the continuity of interest rules should nullify the section
23. 1980-2 C.B. at 118.
24. The continuity of interest test was developed by the judiciary to protect the integ-
rity of the statutory nonrecognition provisions relating to corporate reorganizations. See
Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599
(1932). Application of the test ostensibly insures that a shareholder, claiming benefit of the
nonrecognition provisions, has not in fact cashed in the investment. Thus, part of the con-
sideration received by the shareholder must be in the form of equity, presumably reflecting
continuing interest in the acquiring corporation.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Le Tulle v. Scofield, 296 U.S. 387 (1955) (receipt of bonds of acquiring
utility does not constitute a definite interest to qualify for nonrecognition); Cortland Spe-
cialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.) (stock or securities to be received by
seller to qualify for nonrecognition; notes payable within 14 months are too similar to
cash), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1932); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner,
57 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1932) (short-term purchase-money notes not a sufficiently definite
interest to qualify for nonrecognition), aft'd, 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
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351 segment. At first blush, therefore, Revenue Ruling 80-284 ap-
pears to reach a correct result, but appearances can be deceiving.
Close analysis of the relationship between the reorganization pro-
visions, the continuity of interest requirement, and section 351
may well support the National Starch result.
This Article examines this relationship and considers whether
the IRS position in Revenue Ruling 80-284 withstands close scru-
tiny. In addition, the Article examines other proposed uses of sec-
tion 351 to determine if the fond hopes expressed for this section
in recent years are justified in light of its history and its relation to
other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
I. CHARACTERIZING THE "LARGER" TRANSACTION
According to the IRS position in Revenue Ruling 80-284, the
formation of a holding company in a section 351 exchange, fol-
lowed by a cash merger, is an acquisition pattern common to ac-
quisitive reorganizations." Therefore, the section 351 segment is
simply part of a larger transaction which is essentially a reorgani-
zation, subject to both the statutory and nonstatutory rules which
apply to reorganizations. In particular, the "continuity of inter-
est" test is not satisfied, since the target shareholders in the aggre-
gate have not received sufficient consideration in the form of an
equity interest in the acquiring parent in exchange for their
stock.28
Since failure to comply with the continuity of interest rule ren-
ders the reorganization taxable, all of the shareholders of the tar-
get (including A) have participated in a taxable sale
notwithstanding the fact that some may have received nothing but
stock in the exchange.
To support its conclusion in Revenue Ruling 80-284, the IRS
states that failure to comply with the continuity of interest re-
quirement, as it applies to the larger acquisitive reorganization,
cannot be remedied by mere formal compliance by some target
shareholders with the provisions of section 351. The mere formal-
ity of such compliance cannot alter the substance of the larger
27. 1980-2 C.B. 118.
28. Unfortunately, the courts have never quantified the continuity of interest test, such
that various percentages of equity have been found to satisfy the requirement depending on
the individual case. However, the IRS has indicated that it will rule favorably in reorgani-
zation exchanges where the consideration received in the form of equity equals at least 50%
of the value of the shares transferred. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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reorganization.29
However, two serious objections undercut this line of reason-
ing. First, the IRS characterizes the overall or larger transaction
as a failed acquisitive reorganization only because it follows a pat-
tern common to acquisitive reorganizations. However, the transac-
tion also exhibits a pattern common to a nonreorganization
acquisition. New investors can form a corporation in a transac-
tion meeting the requirements of section 351, intending to
purchase at least 80% of the stock of another corporation, and
then liquidate the newly acquired subsidiary into the acquiring
parent pursuant to section 334(b)(2) in order to achieve a step-up
in the basis of the assets. Such procedures are hardly new and
have received the blessing of the courts, even where shareholders
of the corporation formed to purchase the subsidiary's stock in-
clude some of the shareholders of the acquired subsidiary. Thus,
in Stevens Pass, Inc. v. Commissioner,30 a new corporation formed
by a group of investors acquired all the stock of the old Stevens
Pass Company from its three shareholders. The three sharehold-
ers were to receive $650,000 for their shares, payable partly in
cash with the balance in ten annual installments. Among sub-
scribers for shares of the newly organized corporation were two of
the shareholders of the old Stevens Pass Company, owning be-
tween them 50% of the voting common stock and all of the non-
voting common stock.3 They subscribed for and ultimately
owned 50% of the common stock of the new Stevens Pass, Inc.
After acquisition of the stock, the old corporation was liquidated
into the newly organized acquiring parent. The Commissioner ar-
gued that the parent corporation was not entitled to a step-up in
the basis of the old-corporation's assets because its shares were not
acquired by purchase as required by section 334(b)(3). 32 Instead,
two common shareholders of the old and new corporations simply
had exchanged their old shares plus some cash for stock and de-
bentures of the new corporation. Viewing the transaction from
this perspective, 50% of the old corporation's voting stock would
be considered acquired in a section 351 exchange and the remain-
ing 50% by purchase. Application of the section 334(b)(2) basis
rule would be precluded since section 334(b)(3) requires that 80%
29. See Rev. RuL 80-284, 1980-2 C.B. 118.
30. 48 T.C. 532 (1967).
31. Id. at 535. Kehr and Caley subscribed to shares of the new company, 30% and
20%, respectively.
32. Id. at 538-39.
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of the voting stock (and 80% of the number of all other shares) be
acquired by purchase. An acquisition to which section 351 applies
is expressly excepted from qualifying as a purchase.
The Stevens Pass court refused to adopt the Commissioner's
view of the transaction. Instead, it viewed the formation of the
new corporation as an event separate and independent from the
subsequent purchase agreement, notwithstanding the avowed pur-
pose of acquiring the old Stevens Pass Company's shares, and
notwithstanding that two of the three old shareholders had sub-
scribed for shares of the new corporation before the purchase
agreement was executed.3 Although an integrated larger transac-
tion apparently was contemplated, the court refused to
recharacterize the transaction in the manner suggested by the gov-
ernment.' The old shareholders had not merely traded their old
stock for new stock in a section 351 exchange. Outside investors
had infused new money into the new corporation, precluding inte-
gration of the events and the inevitable recharacterization of the
purchase segment into a nontaxable section 351 exchange. The
court affirmed that the new investors clearly were entitled to a cost
basis in the assets upon liquidation of the old Stevens Pass
Company.
The similarity of the fact patterns in National Starch and Rev-
enue Ruling 80-284 with Stevens Pass is fairly obvious. In all
three situations, substantial new money was infused by an outside
investor in the form of an acquiring parent. In all three situations,
the allocation of stock ownership in the newly organized acquiring
corporation reflected the infusion of new capital and therefore
bore no relation to shareholdings in the target. Finally, in all
three transactions, more than 80% of the target stock was acquired
by purchase. The only significant difference is that the purchase
in National Starch and in Revenue Ruling 80-284 was accom-
plished by a taxable merger, conveniently effecting the purchase
of publicly held stock and squeezing out dissenters. To distin-
guish the two rulings where the purchase was effected by a reverse
cash merger from Stevens Pass, where the purchase was direct,
seems unreasonable. Even the IRS itself disregards the merger
segment and treats it as a purchase of the target shares from the
shareholders.3 4 If the merger segment is disregarded, or is ac-
knowledged as merely a procedure of convenience, then there is
33. Id. at 540.
34. See Rev. Rul. 73-427, 1973-2 C.B. 301.
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no larger transaction common to acquisitive reorganizations call-
ing for application of the continuity of interest rule to invalidate
the section 351 segment. As in Stevens Pass, the organization of a
new corporation followed by an acquisition of the stock of the
target ought to be characterized as a purchase transaction.
Furthermore, in both National Starch and Revenue Ruling 80-
284, an unrelated third party infuses new money, becoming the
major shareholder in the holding company formed pursuant to
section 351. The importance of this infusion can best be appreci-
ated by assuming that the new investor becomes the sole share-
holder of the holding company in a transfer of cash for stock, with
the holding company subsequently acquiring the target stock in a
reverse cash merger. Undoubtedly, this transaction would be
treated simply as a purchase of the target shares. Furthermore,
assuming some target shareholders (less than 20%) cast their lot
with the new investor and exchange their target stock for a minor-
ity interest in the new holding company, it seems unreasonable to
recharacterize the transaction as a pattern common to acquisitive
reorganizations. Indeed, in Curry v. Commissioner,5 the Tax
Court clearly suggested that in such a transaction, the purchase
remains a distinct and separate transaction from the formation of
the purchasing corporation. 6 In Curry, a family group owned un-
divided interests in an office building. Two members of the group
and a new investor formed a corporation to purchase the building.
The Commissioner disallowed the use of a stepped-up cost basis
for the building, contending that notes evidencing the corpora-
tion's indebtedness actually constituted an equity interest in the
corporation. The Commissioner characterized the formation of
the corporation not as a sale but as a section 351 transaction (!)
requiring a carryover basis as to the building under section 362.a7
The Tax Court refused to integrate the formation of the corpora-
tion and the building's transfer into one larger transaction consti-
tuting a section 351 exchange, which would require application of
nonrecognition provisions and a carryover basis.38 The court re-
jected the IRS's position notwithstanding that two of the property
sellers also held 55% of the shares of the purchasing corporation.
The Curry court justified its decision by noting that the other 45%
35. 43 T.C. 667 (1965).
36. Id. at 697.
37. Id. at 685. I.R.C. § 362 (1976) provides for a carryover basis in property acquired
by a corporation in connection with a transaction to which § 351 applies.
38. 43 T.C. at 697.
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shareholder was a new investor and that the parties were capable
of independent action dealing at arm's length.39
The Curry case, in relation to Revenue Ruling 80-284, raises
the possibility that the appropriate characterization of the National
Starch type acquisition is not as a failed reorganization (i.e. a sale,
as the IRS contends in Revenue Ruling 80-284) but instead as a
section 351 transaction in which the requisite transferors are the
acquiring parent as the new investor, the target minority interest
(A), and the target's public shareholders, all acting in concert to
transfer cash and shares to the newly formed holding company.
Viewed this way, the interdependence of steps suggests a larger
transaction constituting a section 351 exchange in which some
transferors receive shares constituting control while others (the
target's public shareholders) receive taxable "boot" in the form of
cash.4° It makes just as much sense to characterize the overall
transaction in this manner as it does to characterize it as a reor-
ganization. The significant difference is that the IRS would have
to grant nonrecognition treatment to A, who receives only nonrec-
ognition property. The result to the public target shareholders
would remain the same, since the receipt of boot is taxable to the
extent thereof. The intriguing question, however, is whether the
desired basis step-up will be achieved upon liquidation of the tar-
get. The issue would be whether the payment of boot to a trans-
feror of stock in a section 351 exchange reconstitutes it as a
purchase, or whether the stock is regarded as acquired in a section
351 exchange and therefore not "purchased" under section
334(b)(3)(B) .4 1 Although A would achieve tax-free treatment, the
ultimate basis step-up for the target assets may be precluded. In
view of the Tax Court's opinion in Stevens Pass, if only a small
39. Id.
40. Section 351 is applicable even if a transferor of assets receives cash or some other
form of property other than stock from the corporation. Gain will be recognized to the
extent of the "boot"-the cash or the value of other property received. I.R.C. § 351(b)
(1976). Under § 351(c), the transferors constituting the control group must, in the aggre-
gate, receive stock or securities sufficient to constitute control. Receipt of boot, although
taxable, does not invalidate the tax-free character of the transfer to the extent that only
nonrecognition property is received. As a result, a § 351 transfer may be partially taxable
and partially a nonrecognition exchange.
41. I.R.C. § 334(b)(1) (1976) provides that, if property is received by a corporation in
a complete liquidation within the meaning of § 332(b), the distributee receives a carryover
basis. However, if the stock of the distributing corporation was acquired by the distributee
by purchase during a specified period, then the basis is stepped up. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2)(B)
(1976). For purposes of § 334(b)(2)(B), the term "purchase" means any acquisition of
stock, but only if the stock is not acquired in an exchange to which § 351 applies. I.R.C.
§ 334(b)(3)(B) (1976).
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minority of the target shareholders engages in the section 351 tax-
free exchange, and the remaining majority receives boot, then the
majority's stock is "purchased" for purposes of section 334(b)(3)
since it is acquired in a taxable transaction. Thus, the two seg-
ments of the Stevens Pass and National Starch type transaction
arguably are integratable into a larger section 351 exchange in
which payment of cash for the target shares constitutes boot to the
transferors, and a "purchase" by the acquiring corporation. After
all, who is to say that the larger transaction is the cash merger and
the smaller is the section 351 exchange? Section 351 contemplates
that any number of transferors may cash in their investment by
accepting boot. The tax-free character of the exchange will not be
tainted for those transferors who accept solely stock or securities
and who qualify as members of the control group. It is not un-
realistic to suggest that the target majority participated in a section
351 exchange taxable to them. This view of the transaction more
closely reflects economic realities by recognizing that the minority
interest has not significantly changed its position with respect to
the target assets. The IRS view in Revenue Ruling 80-284, which
treats the minority as a participant in a failed reorganization, is
considerably harsher. On balance, it appears that this transaction
is best characterized as an incorporation followed by a purchase, a
la Stevens Pass.
Furthermore, characterization of the larger transaction in Rev-
enue Ruling 80-284 as a failed reorganization tacitly implies that
the section 351 segment is illusory and without independent sig-
nificance. By this characterization, mere formal compliance with
section 351 could not properly be permitted to prevail over the
substance of the larger reorganization transaction. Case law has
long held that form may be ignored when the transaction has no
economic significance aside from tax avoidance advantages.42
Invoking well-established judicial principles, Revenue Ruling
80-284 in effect treats the section 351 segment as an interdepen-
dent step in an integrated series of steps, resulting in a pattern
common to acquisitive reorganizations. The ruling thereby im-
plicitly asserts a special application of the step-transaction ap-
proach to characterize the section 351 segment as transitory or
illusory.
Application of the step-transaction doctrine to the factual pat-
42. See, e.g., Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aj7'd, 293 U.S. 465
(1935).
1982]
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tern of National Starch and Revenue Ruling 80-284 is problem-
atic, since litigation has failed to produce a consistent principle for
the application of an integrated transaction or closely related steps
approach. The concept seemingly has different meanings in dif-
ferent contexts, depending on the substantive issues involved.
Generally, either the end result test or the interdependence test
determines application of the step-transaction concept. The end
result test requires integration when the transactions appear to be
component parts of a single transaction intended from the begin-
ning to achieve a particular result. Alternatively, the interdepen-
dence test examines whether, in light of the particular facts and
circumstances, the various segments are so related that the legal
relations created by one step would be meaningless absent com-
pletion of the entire series. 3
The objective of either test is to prevent the victory of form
over substance. Consider the result intended in National Starch
and Revenue Ruling 80-284---that is, nonrecognition of gain to A
and the potential of a stepped-up basis in the target assets in
NEWCO. The particular factual pattern present in these rulings
is not the only means available to achieve this substantive result.
Consequently, one must question the IRS view in Revenue Ruling
80-284 that the larger sale transaction subsumes and therefore
taints the purported section 351 exchange. The very same facts
would equally support the characterizations previously suggested
by the Stevens Pass pattern of incorporation by a new investor
and a minority of the target followed by a purchase of the major-
ity shares, or as a section 351 exchange with boot paid to the ma-
jority also resulting in a purchase of the majority shares.' If the
same result can be achieved by an equally supportable view of the
larger transaction favoring the taxpayer, then the step transaction
approach should not be used to defeat the taxpayer's expecta-
tions.' The section 351 segment should not be treated as illusory
or as a mere formality; otherwise, the result is arbitrary. One's
view of the larger transaction depends on what end of the tele-
scope one chooses to look through.
May B. Kass v. Commissioner"6 is particularly relevant in light
of its striking similarities to National Starch and Revenue Ruling
43. Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INST.
ON FED. TAX'N 247, 274 (1954).
44. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
46. 60 T.C. 218 (1973), af'd, 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974).
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80-284. In Kass, a small minority of shareholders of corporation
A joined with new investors to form corporation B, with the
avowed purpose of acquiring at least 80% of the A shares for cash
prior to its liquidation into B, thus achieving a basis step-up for
A's assets under section 334(b)(2).47 A's shareholders who partici-
pated in B's formation traded their A shares for B shares in a tax-
free exchange pursuant to section 351, although the taxpayer's A
shares were not acquired for cash or purchased under the dissent-
ing shareholder provisions.48 Instead, B stock was exchanged for
A stock on a one-for-one basis upon the subsequent merger. The
Commissioner successfully argued that the taxpayer was not enti-
tled to nonrecognition treatment because A's historical sharehold-
ers did not receive sufficient equity in exchange for their A stock
to satisfy the continuity of interest rule.4 9
One taxpayer contention deserves special consideration: Since
the cash purchase of the A shares and the A's merger into B are
viewed as parts of a single taxable transaction for reorganization
and continuity purposes, the incorporation of B under section 351
also should be integrated into the transaction.50 Consequently,
the taxpayer should be viewed as constructively participating in
the tax-free section 351 transaction with other minority sharehold-
ers who actually did participate.51
Significantly, the court refused to integrate the section 351 ex-
change into the purchase and merger, despite the brief two-and-
one-half month time interval between the transactions.52 The Tax
Court's opinion, though somewhat cryptic overall, nevertheless
plainly concluded: "Briefly, the answer to this argument is that
while the purchase and merger were interdependent events, peti-
tioner's exchange of ACRA stock for TRACK stock was not 'mu-
tually interdependent' with the incorporation transfers made by
the Levys, Caseys, and 18 other individuals. ' 53 The court rea-
soned that "[t]his result merely illustrates the truism that the step-
transaction doctrine, even when worded consistently.. . and ap-
plied to identical facts, may result in integration in one case and
47. 60 T.C. at 219-20.
48. Id. at 220.
49. Id. at 221-22.
50. Id. at 226.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 220. TRACK ("corporation B") purchased tendered shares on February 11,
1966; the plan of liquidation and merger was adopted on March 8, 1966. The taxpayer
exchanged ACRA ("corporation A") shares for TRACK shares shortly thereafter.
53. Id. at 226.
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'separateness' in another case simply because the legal question to
be answered has changed." 54
The Tax Court simply restates the proposition, distilled from
litigation, that application of an integration doctrine depends
upon the context, in the absence of a universally applicable rule.
More specifically, its applicability may depend upon the substan-
tive Code provision at issue. The Kass court apparently was con-
vinced that the section 351 exchange, the cash purchase, and the
subsequent merger were not interdependent steps in a series. In
short, the factual pattern in Kass apparently did not require a
step-transaction analysis."
The transaction in Kass does not markedly differ from that
described in National Starch or in Revenue Ruling 80-284. In
each, a section 351 exchange in which only a minority of the target
shareholders participates is followed by an acquisition effected
through a taxable sale of stock by the target's majority sharehold-
ers. Ultimately, upon liquidation of the target, the entity receiving
the target assets will obtain a step-up in basis proportional to the
amount of target stock acquired by purchase. More importantly,
the historical shareholders fail to meet the continuity of interest
requirement in either transaction. Given these fundamental simi-
larities, the steps in National Starch and in Revenue Ruling 80-
284 should not be viewed as any more interdependent than those
in Kass. Formation of a corporation under section 351 to acquire
another corporation's stock is clearly acceptable as a prelude to
liquidation of the target and a basis step-up under section
334(b)(2). Kass tacitly accepts that the section 351 incorporation
of the acquiring parent may involve a small minority of target
shareholders exchanging stock as well as infusion of new money
or new assets-all without adverse consequences for the target
minority.
The Tax Court unfortunately did not explain why the section
351 incorporation and the subsequent cash sale and merger were
not mutually interdependent, calling for separateness rather than
integration. However, a reasonable explanation is readily appar-
ent. All transactions which are part of a planned series are inevi-
tably "interdependent" in that they reflect a discernable pattern of
54. Id.
55. Of course, in Kass, the taxpayer earnestly sought application of an integrated
transaction approach, whereas in National Starch and in Revenue Ruling 80-284, the gov-
ernment sought application of that approach. This factual distinction, however, should not
determine whether the concept applies.
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progression designed to achieve a desired economic result. Never-
theless, these transactions should not be integrated, collapsed, or
treated as parts of a larger configuration if the intermediate steps
and end result have independent economic significance aside from
an anticipated tax advantage. For example, the integration in
Kass of the section 351 formation of corporation A with the sub-
sequent cash purchase and merger of corporation B would make
little economic sense due to the configuration and alignment of
economic interests. Formation of A through infusion of substan-
tial new money by new investors represents a new economic inter-
est, separate and distinct from the target. Failure of a small
minority of B shareholders to align themselves with this new eco-
nomic entity is insignificant. Next, the newly created economic
interest acquires by purchase the bulk of B's shares in order to
liquidate B and obtain its assets. The Internal Revenue Code be-
nignly regards this procedure as an asset acquisition, permitting a
step-up basis in the assets so acquired to reflect the cost of their
acquisition.56 The taxpayer, a member of a group whose eco-
nomic interest was distinct and separate from A and its sharehold-
ers, simply chose not to participate. Her economic interests
aligned more with the B majority, which had nothing to do with A
and its principals. Integration of the section 351 segment with the
purchase and liquidation to provide a tax advantage for a B share-
holder belatedly seeking alignment with A is unsupportable.
Therein lies the mystery of separateness of the section 351 seg-
ment from the subsequent two steps: no community or commonal-
ity of economic interest exists between the taxpayer and the group
she might have joined.
This Kass analysis also applies to National Starch and to Rev-
enue Ruling 80-284, since the minority shareholder of the target in
each case chose alignment with the acquiring parent as new inves-
tor, creating a new economic entity. Shifting the minority share-
holder to the public target majority is no more sensible than
shifting Mrs. Kass into a minority aligning itself with the new in-
vestor. The different economic interests are too distinct. If sepa-
rateness is the key to the result in Kass, it is no less applicable in
Revenue Ruling 80-284. Considering the distinct realignment of
economic interests preventing the result urged by the IRS in Ste-
vens Pass,5 7 and the similar realignment reflected by formation of
56. See supra note 5.
57. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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the holding company to preclude its characterization as part of a
larger acquisitive reorganization, Revenue Ruling 80-284 clearly
seems incorrect.
An additional reason precludes treating the two segments of
the transaction as interdependent parts of an integrated whole.
The IRS characterization of the larger transaction in Revenue
Ruling 80-284 as a sale is predicated upon an implied end result
concept. 58 This doctrine, like other views of the step transaction
approach, affirms the basic principle that tax consequences must
turn on substance rather than on form. Yet the transaction in Na-
tional Starch and in Revenue Ruling 80-284 did not reflect a mere
desire to achieve a particular tax result, but rather an accommoda-
tion of conflicting economic interests. The choice of proceeding
under the reorganization provisions or under section 351 has in-
dependent significance to the target minority; it has no signifi-
cance to the other parties since the end result to them would be the
same either way. Recharacterization of the transaction as a sale
ignores the fact that a straightforward cash merger would not
meet the nontax needs of all the parties, particularly those of the
target minority. The section 351 segment thus serves an independ-
ent nontax end.
Thus, there are at least two situations in which the step-trans-
action approach should not be applied, thereby precluding appli-
cation of the reorganization continuity rules. The step-transaction
approach is inapplicable (1) where the factual pattern permits at
least two distinct characterizations of the facts resulting in distinct
tax results and (2) where the particular transaction chosen is dic-
tated by the peculiar needs of one or more of the parties and
recharacterization based on alleged interdependency does not
equally satisfy those needs. Both National Starch and Revenue
Ruling 80-284 involve a factual pattern precluding interdepen-
dence of the section 351 exchange and the subsequent reorganiza-
tion. Recharacterization equally and principally supports the
view that the overall transaction is actually a section 351 exchange
and not a reorganization. The peculiar form of the transaction
chosen satisfies the particular needs and circumstances of one of
the parties which could not otherwise have been served.
One final aspect must be addressed. The parties in Revenue
Ruling 80-284 chose the form of transaction and the sequence of
58. The end result concept recharacterizes purportedly separate steps as parts of a
single, unified whole when the ultimate result is intended from the outset.
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steps.59 Consequently, application of the continuity of interest
rules based on an interdependence theory cannot be avoided by
recharacterizing the facts to alter the substance. This presumably
would result in whipsawing by both the Treasury and taxpayers. 60
Although justifiable where one party to the transaction unilater-
ally attempts such a recharacterization in a separate proceeding, it
has no merit upon application for a letter ruling in a situation
where interdependence can support a characterization favorable
to the taxpayer as well as to the government. No whipsawing re-
sults if the final transaction is simply given its normal effect with-
out imposing interdependence to establish a larger transaction
subsuming and eclipsing the lesser.
II. CONTINUITY OF INTEREST, REORGANIZATIONS, AND
SECTION 351
The IRS position in Revenue Ruling 80-284 is basically a syl-
logism. The major premise is that section 351 applies only where
there has been a mere change in the form of asset ownership and
not where there is a "cashing in" of the investment. The minor
premise is that the sequence of events, including the section 351
segment, is a pattern common to acquisitive reorganizations re-
quiring application of the continuity of interest rules. Since the
required continuity of interest is absent, the transaction constitutes
a "cashing in"--a sale-and section 351 is inapplicable.
Thus far the discussion has focused on the validity of the IRS's
characterization of the entire series of steps as a reorganization
pattern. Yet applicability of the reorganization continuity of inter-
est rules in the context of National Starch and Revenue Ruling 80-
284 is open to challenge. The IRS contention that the section 351
segment is integrated into a larger reorganization to which the
continuity of interest rules applies is appealing at first blush.
However, examination of the relationship between the reorganiza-
tion provisions and section 351, and applicability of the continuity
of interest rule to both, casts doubt on this assertion.
The present reorganization provisions and the present section
351 share a common statutory parentage. Both provisions origi-
59. See Kass, 60 T.C. at 225. In Kass, the court stipulated that the selling sharehold-
ers of the ACRA subsidiary, the organizers of the TRACK parent, and the nontendering,
nondissenting shareholders such as Mrs. Kass chose the procedure. 60 T.C. at 225.
60. "To allow one [of the parties] in a separate proceeding to characterize the facts as
being in substance something else would lay the groundwork for an enormous amount of
'whipsawing' by and against both the taxpayers and the Government." Id. at 225-26.
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nally appeared in section 202(c) of the Revenue Act of 192161 as
parts of a tripartite package of nonrecognition provisions. These
provisions included the skeletal predecessors of the present reor-
ganization exchanges, transfers to controlled corporations, and
"like for like" exchanges,62 respectively. Unfortunately, there is
scant legislative history discussing this particular provision of the
1921 Act. The Senate Finance Committee Report tersely stated
that a departure from the present day presumption in favor of tax-
ability was necessary, and that nontaxability would eliminate "ec-
onomically unsound constructions" and permit business "to go
forward with the readjustments required by existing conditions."63
According to the report, all three transactions described in the sec-
tion constitute trades despite realization of a technical gain, since
there is no gain in the popular sense absent a cash distribution.
"Technical gain" is shorthand for suggesting that some exchanges
merely result in a change in the form of ownership, of which cer-
tain reorganizations and section 351 exchanges are prime exam-
ples. For instance, if a sole proprietor incorporates a going
business by shifting from direct to indirect ownership through
shares of stock representing control, the proprietor has merely
changed the form of ownership without realizing gain as generally
understood.
In the Revenue Act of 1924, 4 Congress separated the reorgan-
ization provisions from section 351 exchanges. In 1934, Congress
further refined the reorganization provisions by creating a special
category of transactions now described in section 368(a)(1)(B) and
368(a)(1)(C), both containing specific continuity of interest re-
quirements.65 These changes reflect a continuing concern with
continuity of interest, categorizing and defining the degree of con-
tinuity of interest required in a variety of exchange transactions.
From its inception, section 351 has carefully defined "control"
as 80% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
61. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (1921).
62. These provisions now are contained in separate code sections. I.R.C. §§ 368, 354
and 356 govern reorganizations; § 351 governs transfers to controlled corporations; and
§ 1031 governs "like for like" exchanges.
63. S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1936-1 C.B. (Part 2) 181,
188-89.
64. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(b)(I)-(3), 43 Stat. 254, 256 (1924).
65. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1976) requires that immediately after the acquisition, the
acquiring corporation has control, whether or not it had control immediately before the
acquisition. Section 368(a)(1)(C) requires that the acquiring corporation must acquire sub-
stantially all of the properties of the target corporation.
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entitled to vote and 80% of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock.66 As a result, section 351 contains a built-in statu-
tory continuity of interest provision insuring against a mere
change in form of ownership. No similar statutory requirement of
continuity was originally included in the reorganization provi-
sions. Therefore, section 351 and the reorganization provisions
conspicuously differed ab initio despite their common statutory
parentage.
Concern with continuity of interest in reorganizations
prompted the courts to engraft a requirement even where not
specified by statute. Absent an express provision, a transaction in
which consideration for the transfer of shares or assets is primarily
in the form of cash or a cash equivalent could be treated as a
reorganization entitled to nonrecognition. However, exemption
from taxation would be contrary to the notion of nonrecognition
granted a mere change in the form of ownership. The courts have
attempted but failed to develop a systematic view of continuity of
interest; apparently continuity of interest in a reorganization pri-
marily depends upon the qualiy of the consideration and not nec-
essarily its quantity. Although an equity interest in the acquiring
corporation must constitute a substantial part of the aggregate
consideration received for shares surrendered, the precise amount
of equity in proportion to cash or its equivalent has never been
firmly established.
The IRS has quantified the equity required in a guideline test
for advance rulings in reorganizations. Revenue Procedure 77-
3767 states that continuity of interest is satisfied for ruling purposes
if shareholders of the acquired corporation receive an equity inter-
est in the acquiring corporation equal in value to at least 50% of
the acquired corporation's outstanding stock as of the date of
transfer.68
Bifurcation of the continuity of interest rule for reorganiza-
tions and section 351 exchanges is clearly significant. Congress
imposed a strict requirement that the mere change in form be evi-
denced by a quality and quantity of consideration insuring the
transferor's continuing interest in the affairs of the business. If a
transferor emerges with 80% of the voting power and 80% of non-
voting shares, then the quality or quantity of ownership has not
66. I.R.C. § 351 (1976).
67. 1977-2 C.B. 568.
68. Id.
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been changed. Ownership fights remain virtually intact in the
form of equity (stock) received by the transferor. Since equity al-
locates control rights, distribution rights, and rights to proceeds
upon liquidation, many economists consider shareholder rights in
the aggregate sufficient to justify treating both shareholders and
corporation as a single, undifferentiated economic unit.69
Significantly, Congress originally did not impose statutory
continuity of interest requirements in reorganizations. Only in the
course of defining and refining reorganization exchanges were re-
quirements later imposed.70 Nevertheless, judicially engrafted
limitations and the quantified rule in Revenue Procedure 77-37
are not nearly as stringent as the section 351 continuity of interest
requirement. Even where the permissible form of consideration
received in a reorganization is statutorily stipulated, the amount
of stock of the acquiring corporation which the distributees must
receive is unspecified. These differences reflect congressional in-
tent that reorganizations and section 351 exchanges are economi-
cally distinguishable transactions.
Where a shareholder exchanges stock in a closely held corpo-
ration solely for shares of a large publicly owned acquiring corpo-
ration in a statutory merger, continuity of interest is present in
terms of the quality of the consideration received. However, the
shareholder's economic position changes radically; control rights
in the closely held corporation are surrendered in exchange for a
miniscule interest in a large corporation. Congress must have
contemplated and tacitly approved nonrecognition treatment in
reorganization transactions which inherently alter the target
shareholder's relationship to the resulting corporation's asset pool.
Loss of control is considered secondary to the lack of realized gain
in the popular sense.
Senate deliberations on section 202 of the Revenue Act of
69. See McClure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes. The Miss-
ing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REy. 532, 535 (1975).
70. In 1939, Congress amended the reorganization provisions, separating stock and
asset acquisitions into "B" and "C" reorganizations. Revenue Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 862.
Clause B (corresponding to present section 368(a)(1)(B)) provides for a statutory continuity
of interest rule in stock acquisitions by requiring acquisition of 80% of the stock of a target
solely in exchange for voting stock of the acquiring corporation. Clause C (corresponding
to present section 368(a)(1)(C)) permits asset for stock exchanges. These provisions were
originally included in the Revenue Act of 1934, although not in separate clauses, to pre-
clude formal compliance with the loose definition of reorganization so as to achieve tax-
free treatment in a transaction which was essentially a disguised sale. See S. REP. No. 558,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (part 2) 586, 598-99.
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1921,71 reveal that "reorganization" originally had been defined to
include transactions in which shareholders' economic interests
were radically altered. Senator Reed, for example, observed:
Suppose that corporation A, instead of selling itself outright
to corporation B, sells its interest in corporation A to corpora-
tion B, which has taken in four or five other corporations, and
.. . that instead of getting the cash, stock is issued. What is
that stock? It is stock in an entirely new thing, stock in an en-
tirely new corporation, which takes a lot of new elements of
value. It partakes of the nature of a sale, and not of the nature
of an exchange of property.
He has, in fact, sold his concern for stock in a new concern,
and it is just as much a sale as though he had sold it for cash
and afterwards gone and bought stock in the new concern.
The trouble with this arrangement as you have it figured out
now, Senators, is that you are dealing with a transaction which
is, in fact, more of a sale than an exchange-as though it were
an exchange. It is, in fact, a sale, and should be treated as a
sale, and if there have been profits made by that sale, then those
profits should be ascertained and taxed.7 z
In section 351, absence of gain in the popular sense alone is
insufficient to justify nonrecognition. Instead, this section also re-
quires transferors constituting the control group to retain, in the
aggregate, a similar degree of ownership in the corporate asset
pool as held prior to incorporation. Typically, a sole proprietor
incorporates a going business, or a partnership is incorporated in
which control is allocated to former partners by virtue of stock
ownership.
Comparatively, the function of the continuity of interest rule
in reorganizations and section 351 exchanges is distinct. In reor-
ganizations, continuity of interest insures nonrecognition treat-
ment where the quality of the consideration received is essentially
equivalent in quality to that surrendered, notwithstanding loss of
control. In section 351 nontaxable exchanges, continuity of inter-
est insures continuity of control as well as lack of realization of
gain in the popular sense. These functional distinctions reflect the
essential economic differences between the two transactions.
However, application of the continuity of interest rule in atypi-
cal situations challenges this distinction based on function. In one
atypical case, a transferor together with 1000 other transferors act-
71. 61 CONG. REC. 6568 (1921); see also SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
,INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938-1861 at 797 (1938).
72. 61 CONG. REc. at 6568.
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ing in concert form a new corporate enterprise, surrendering prop-
erty in exchange for stock representing control.73 Section 351
applies to all transferors, despite the differences in control, distri-
bution and liquidation rights between the new enterprise's asset-
pool and the assets transferred.74 Nevertheless, applicability of
section 351 is beyond objection. First, although the individual
transferor loses a degree of control over the transferred asset, sec-
tion 351 properly applies not only to an individual transferor, but
to a "control group" consisting of individuals joining together in a
common economic enterprise. This group represents a commu-
nity of economic interests and a collective economic personality
forged prior to formal incorporation. Therefore, the control group
should receive both a quantity and quality of consideration for
transferred assets preserving its pre-incorporation economic rela-
tionship to the asset pool. Section 351 characteristically focuses
on a discrete grouping or community of economic interests, and
not necessarily on one particular member of the group. As a re-
sult, control group members need not retain the same proportion
of interest in the corporation as possessed in the transferred as-
sets.75 Consequently, the underlying rationale of section 351 cov-
ering a union of economic interests and a collective
transferor/shareholder personality applies even to the atypical
case.
76
73. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 3.01, at 3-5 to 3-6 (4th ed. 1979). Professor Bittker suggests that the
application of § 351 to such an exchange would be a "triumph of literalism." Id. Never-
theless, each transferor becomes a member of the statutory "control group." In my view,
§ 35 l's primary focus on the aggregate of transferors as a unique grouping of economic
interests is precisely what precludes "a triumph of literalism" through its application in this
example.
74. Cf. Rev. Rul. 78-294, 1978-2 C.B. 141. The IRS clearly is of the opinion that § 351
applies where an individual transfers business property to a corporation in exchange for
stock, while other individuals purchase stock from an underwriter. The latter investors are
considered together with the individual transferor as members of the control group, even
though their relationship to the corporation is quite distinct.
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(1) (1955). Of course, such disproportionate interest sug-
gests that a transferor either made a gift, received compensation, or benefitted in some
other way. Id.
76. This view of § 351 is further supported by the 1966 congressional amendment of
that section which eliminated nonrecognition treatment for so-called "swap-fund" ex-
changes. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809 § 203(A), 80 Stat. 1539,
1577 (codified at I.R.C. § 351(d) (1976)). In a "swap-fund" exchange, individuals transfer
assets to a regulated investment company, a real estate investment trust or a corporation,
80% of whose assets consists of readily marketable securities. These exchanges allow each
transferor to diversify individual holdings without "cashing in" the investment in the trans-
ferred assets. Yet such diversification represents a splintering of economic interests among
the transferors, creating a kind of economic "anomie," instead of the community of inter-
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However, the reorganization provisions do not include an ex-
press continuity of interest requirement, either as to quantity or
quality of the consideration received.77 Yet neither the judicially
created continuity rule nor its quantified IRS counterpart require
shareholders of an acquired corporation to receive any particular
degree of control in the acquiring parent. The effect of the consid-
eration received by the target's shareholders on their post-reor-
ganization interest in the parent is quite irrelevant; the sole and
primary focus of the continuity rule is the nature of the considera-
tion. Admittedly, in both the section 351 and the reorganization
provisions, the target shareholders are treated as a group solely to
determine if the quality of the consideration received, in the aggre-
gate, meets the continuity requirement. This is a far cry from the
strict section 351 control requirement for the aggregate of
transferors.
Not all acquisitive reorganizations involve acquisition of a
small target by a large corporation. Merger of two publicly held
corporations may result in no real economic change for any target
shareholders. A prior minor interest continues as a minority inter-
est in terms of control, distribution, and liquidation rights. Re-
gardless, presence or absence of changes in economic relationships
to the new asset pool is irrelevant in reorganizations; those same
changes are critical in section 351 exchanges.78 What are the im-
plications of the foregoing analysis for National Starch and Reve-
nue Ruling 80-284? Revenue Ruling 80-284 relies primarily upon
two related lines of argument: (1) section 351 does not apply
where gain is realized in the "ordinary business sense" since such
application would be contrary to the underlying purposes and as-
sumptions; and (2) nonrecognition in the light of such realization
is inconsistent with the history and purpose of the continuity of
interest doctrine.
However, these two propositions are applicable to acquisitive
reorganizations, resting upon an interdependence principle subor-
dinating the section 351 segment described in the rulings. Yet
coupling these segments into a larger taxable transaction is im-
proper. The section 351 segment serves a dual purpose for the
target minority. Minority shareholders were able to dissociate
themselves from other shareholders and join economically with
ests contemplated by § 351. Elimination of nonrecognition treatment for "swap fund" ex-
changes was a predictable and salutory development.
77. See supra text accompanying note 66.
78. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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the parent. As a result, the minority realized no gain in the ordi-
nary business sense, emerging with virtually the same interest in
precisely the same assets as possessed before the transaction. This
exact transaction fulfills the underlying purpose and object of sec-
tion 351. Had the minority shareholder remained allied with the
public majority, the continuity of interest rule applicable to reor-
ganizations would have resulted in recognition of gain. By disso-
ciating from other target shareholders, the minority entered into a
section 351 transaction which cannot be summarily integrated into
a larger acquisitive reorganization pattern. The section 351 seg-
ment is an independent transaction, requiring application of its
own continuity of interest rules distinct from those applicable to
reorganizations. Consider the result if the acquiring parent had
transferred appreciated assets to the newly created holding com-
pany instead of cash. Should the acquiring parent realize gain on
the transfer simply because it transferred an appreciated noncash
asset rather than cash? The acquiring parent never had a preexist-
ing interest in the target to be continued, and so application of the
continuity of interest rules to defeat the section 351 segment is
precluded. Furthermore, anyone associating with the parent as a
transferor of property (and becoming a member of the control
group) is entitled to the protection of section 351. Economic dis-
sociation of the target minority from the public shareholders and
subsequent alliance with the acquiring parent is sufficient to pre-
vent the integration of the section 351 segment with the larger tax-
able transaction. If the two segments cannot be treated as
interdependent because each represents a separate and distinct
economic result, then application of the continuity rules of one
segment to the other is unjustifiable.
III. SECTION 269: THE NEMESIS OF SECTION 351
Assuming Revenue Ruling 80-284 is unsupportable and Na-
tional Starch is correct, the efficacy of using holding companies
created pursuant to section 351 to achieve purposes already dis-
cussed remains unanswered. Whether effect should be given to
the section 351 segment in any complex transaction depends upon
its relation to other segments. The essential question is whether
the particular role of the 351 segment in the entire series of trans-
actions is consistent with that provision's underlying policy and
purpose.
Consider a scheme whereby shareholders of a successful oper-
ating company (OPCO) transfer their shares to a newly created
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holding company (NEWCO) for NEWCO stock in a section 351
transaction. NEWCO then borrows a large sum from a bank, us-
ing the OPCO stock as collateral. Loan proceeds are subsequently
distributed to shareholders without tax incidence, since OPCO has
no earnings and profits. 79 The loan eventually will be repaid from
dividends paid by OPCO to NEWCO which are received essen-
tially tax-free under section 243.80 This scheme"' does not violate
section 35 1's underlying policy since the exchange does not result
in a significant realignment of economic interests. However, un-
like National Starch and Revenue Ruling 80-284, this particular
section 351 segment has no economic or business significance in
and of itself, nor is it part of a series of transactions which (in the
aggregate) have any serious business purpose. It is simply a gim-
mick. Nevertheless, Judge Learned Hand concluded long ago that
one should not dismiss a legally binding transaction as a "sham"
since that unsavory characterization may be unnecessary to pro-
tect revenues from tax gimmicks8 2 The proposed use of section
351 can be effectively precluded by the rarely applied section
269(a).83
79. A dividend is defined as a distribution out of earnings and profits of the current
year or out of accumulated earnings and profits. I.R.C. § 316(a) (1976). A distribution to a
shareholder absent earnings and profits is regarded as a return of capital, reducing the
adjusted basis of the stock. To the extent such distribution exceeds the adjusted basis, it
receives capital gains treatment. Id. at 301(c).
80. See supra note 18.
8 1. This idea is not the author's; instead, it is suggested by such cases as Falcoff v.
Commissioner, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9569 (7th Cir. 1979), in which a corporation
borrowed funds from a third party and then effected a distribution in a year when it had no
earnings and profits. See Freeman, Holding Companies-Part I" Section 351 as a Lever to
AvoidRestrictions Inherent in Section 368, Section 306, and Sections 304 and302, 6 J. CORP.
TAX'N 332, 342 (1980).
82. See Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hand, J., dissenting).
83. Sec. 269. Acquisitions made to evade or avoid income tax.
(a) In general.
If-
(1) any person or persons acquire, or acquired on or after October 8, 1940,
directly or indirectly, control of a corporation, or
(2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or after October 8, 1940,
directly or indirectly, property of another corporation, not controlled, directly
or indirectly, immediately before such acquisition, by such acquiring corpora-
tion or its stockholders, the basis of which property, in the hands of the ac-
quiring corporation, is determined by reference to the basis in the hands of the
transferor corporation,
and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or
avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit
or other allowance which such person or corporation would not otherwise en-
joy, then the Secretary may disallow such deduction, credit, or other allow-
ance. For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2), control means the ownership of
stock possessing at least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all
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Although originally enacted in 1943 to prevent abuse of the
reorganization provisions in connection with the carryover of ex-
cess profits tax credits,84 section 269 has now fallen into disuse
through restriction of loss carryover provisions in sections 381 and
382.85 Yet this provision remains a potent weapon ideally suited
to remedy abuses of section 351. Section 269(a) provides for disal-
lowance of any "credit, deduction or other allowance" where a per-
son or persons acquire control of a corporation for the principal
purpose of evading or avoiding federal income tax by securing the
benefit of such deduction, credit or other allowance. Section
269(a) also applies where one corporation acquires the assets of
another corporation absent prior control.
Any section 351 exchange constitutes acquisition of control by
a person or persons of a corporation. The critical issue is whether
the principal purpose of obtaining control is evasion or avoidance
of tax to secure a benefit not otherwise obtainable. Moreover, that
benefit must be in the form of a deduction, credit, or other allow-
ance. Unfortunately, defining "principal purposes" in relation to
income taxation has engendered substantial controversy. Accord-
ing to one court, there are two relevant classes of purposes-tax
classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 50 percent of the total value of
shares of all classes of stock of the corporation.
(b) Power of Secretary to allow deduction, etc., in part.
In any case to which subsection (a) applies, the Secretary is authorized-
(1) to allow as a deduction, credit, or allowance any part of any amount
disallowed by such subsection, if he determines that such allowance will not
result in the evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax for which the acquisi-
tion was made; or
(2) to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, and distribute,
apportion, or allocate the deductions, credits, or allowances the benefit of
which was sought to be secured, between or among the corporations, or
properties, or parts thereof, involved, and to allow such deductions, credits, or
allowances so distributed, apportioned, or allocated, but to give effect to such
allowance only to such extent as he determines will not result in the evasion or
avoidance of Federal income tax for which the acquisition was made; or
(3) to exercise his powers in part under paragraph (1) and in part under
paragraph (2).
84. See S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1943). Reports of both the House
Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee referred to abuses by corpo-
rations with substantial excess profits in acquiring corporations with current or prospective
losses in order to offset those losses against the acquiring corporation's profits.
85. I.R.C. § 381 (1976) provides specific rules for carryover of tax attributes in certain
tax-free acquisitions. The provision was enacted in response to easily circumvented rules
developed by the courts relating primarily to the form of the transaction. I.R.C. 382 (West
Supp. 1982) contains restrictions and limitations on carryover of tax attributes, which in
conjunction with § 269 discourages primarily tax motivated acquisitions. New § 382, en-
acted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, affects acquisitions in taxable years after June
30, 1982.
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avoidance and nontax avoidance.86 Section 269 applies if the tax
avoidance purpose exceeds the nQntax avoidance purpose.87 Al-
though this construction is not entirely satisfactory, it is perhaps
the best available guide in this perplexing area.
The contrived use of section 351 seems to run afoul of the pro-
visions of section 269. Organization of the holding cpmpany under
section 351 as a receptacle for the operating compnany's stock is
primarily designed to enable the holding company to make a dis-
tribution to shareholders. Assuming the holding company per-
forms no other function, then its nonexistent earnings and profits
account is merely exploited to secure an otherwise unobtainable
advantage. Tax avoidance is clearly the principal purpose of ac-
quisition of control.
The precise language of section 269(a) requiring that tax
avoidance be accomplished by securing a "deduction, credit or
other allowance" is more problematic. In the hypothetical case,
avoidance is not accomplished by way of a deduction or credit;
consequently, the term "allowance" must bear the burden. Regu-
lation 1.269-1(a) provides that an "allowance" is anything in the
tax law which diminishes tax liability.8" Therefore, avoidance of a
taxable dividend distribution by exploiting a newly organized cor-
poration without current or accumulated earnings and profits cer-
tainly seems to be an "allowance." While this broad
interpretation may not win unanimous judicial support,89 it never-
theless appears to be reasonable in light of section 269's statutory
purpose. A strained exegesis of section 351 or its related reorgani-
zation provisions is unnecessary to effectively eliminate clear
abuse of that section. Furthermore, it is unnecessary to argue
"sham transaction" or rely upon a variety of other nonstatutory
tax principles of uncertain application. 90 S ction 269 adequately
guards the integrity of section 351, preventing its abuse.91
86. See Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 231, 239 (5th Cir. 1969).
87. Id.
88. Treas. Reg. § 1-269-1(a) (1962).
89. See, e.g., John F. Nutt v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 231 (1962).
90. Nonstatutory principles include business purpose requirements, anticipatory as-
signment of income and the tax benefit rule, all of which are uncertain in application and
depend upon a particular court's interpretation.
91. Admittedly, other statutory provisions may also preclde abuse of § 351. For ex-
ample, § 492 has been invoked successfully to prevent distortion of income arising from a
well-timed incorporation of a going business. See, e.g., Rooney v. United States 305 F.2d
681 (9th Cir. 1962) where a cash basis farmer incorporated his farming operation after
incurring expenses for sowing the crop but prior to receipt of any income for the calendar
year. On his individual return, the farmer sought to carry back to prior years the resulting
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The proposed use of section 269 would not interfere with legit-
imate uses of section 351 in situations where creation of the hold-
ing company has a primarily nonavoidance purpose. Thus, where
the exchange of operating company shares for holding company
shares is designed to avoid restrictons on the type of business in
which the operating company may engage, section 269 would
have no application. Indeed, this proposition is illustrated in the
well known "Cincinnati Bengals" ruling92 involving a section 351
exchange of operating company stock for holding company stock.
The operating company, a somewhat successful professional foot-
ball team, sought to dvoid league restrictions on diversification of
corporate activities by arranging a line of credit for new business
acquisition through the holding company secured by the operating
company stock. When one new venture had been secured, the op-
erating company paid a dividend to the holding company en-
abling it to pay its indebtedness. Since the loan funds exceeded
the amount required for the acquisition, the holding company
made a section 301(c) distribution to the shareholders. The "Cin-
cinnati Bengals" transaction is distinguishable from the suggested
hypothetical, where the principal purpose was clearly tax avoid-
ance. Where tax avoidance is not the principal purpose, section
351 should be given its normal effect. By this standard, formation
of a holding company under section 351 to avoid local law restric-
tions on acquisitions of insurance companies in triangular mergers
should be granted nonrecognition treatment.
The relationship of section 269 to National Starch and Reve-
nue Ruling 80-284 raises one final problem. Does the National
Starch transaction fall within the scope of section 269? Arguably,
control of the holding company was acquired principally for the
purpose of avoiding a taxable exchange under the reorganization
provisions. That purpose presumably would be within the broad
definition of "other allowance" adopted in the regulations,93 as
diminishing a tax liability. However, the additional statutory re-
quirement that the "allowance" would not otherwise have been
net operating loss to obtain a refund on taxes previously paid. The court in Rooney held
that the IRS correctly reallocated the expenses to the corporation under § 482, eliminating
the claimed loss. In short, § 482 prevailed over the § 351 exchange, even though its appli-
cation caused the taxpayer to realize income upon incorporation of his business.
92. Technical Advice Memorandum 784102, undated, I.R.S. LETrER RULINGS RE-
PORTS (CCH) No. 85 (Oct. 17, 1978). This line of argument apparently depends upon the
persuasiveness of the nontax avoidance motive.
93. See supra text accompanying note 88.
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enjoyed must be satisfied.94 If organization of the holding com-
pany under section 351 is the sole method to effect a tax-free ex-
change for the target minority and a step-up in basis of the target
assets, then section 269 appears to justify disallowance of section
351 benefits. However, combination of the section 351 exchange
and the cash merger was only one of at least two alternatives
whereby the parties could obtain their objectives. 95 Transfer of all
target stock to the holding company (and cash by the parent) in
exchange for holding company shares (and cash for the target ma-
jority), would achieve the same tax objectives, including increase
in the target assets, basis by the amount of gain recognized by the
majority. In Cromwell Corp. v. Commissioner,96 the Tax Court re-
fused to apply section 269 where a new corporation was formed to
purchase stock of another corporation, using a newly secured
bank loan ultimately repaid out of intercorporate dividends which
would not be taxable in a consolidated return.97 The benefit con-
sisted of a tax-free dividend, and elimination of the dividend in
the consolidated return constituted an allowance.98 The court
held that no benefit which would not otherwise have been enjoyed
was obtained in the transaction, since the parties might have em-
ployed several alternatives to attain the same objectives. 99 Conse-
quently, a "but for" test is inappropriate in applying section 269 to
these circumstances and use of a consolidated return did not con-
travene the provision.
In view of Cromwell, section 269 apparently does not preclude
use of section 351 exchanges in the National Starch context. How-
ever, variations of the National Starch and Revenue Ruling 80-
284 transaction may not enjoy section 351 immunity if used to
achieve a benefit not otherwise attainable.
Nonapplicability of section 269 to the National Starch pattern
raises one more issue. One writer has suggested that the IRS's real
objection in a National Starch transaction is not the target minor-
ity's nonrecognition of gain, but rather the combination of section
94. IRC § 269(a) (1976).
95. Other alternatives come to mind. For example, the target minority shareholder
might exchange his target common stock for preferred in a tax-free recapitalization, while
public shareholders could simply sell their common stock to the new corporation; recapital-
ization provisions do not include a continuity of interest requirement. See Berner v.
United States, 282 F.2d 720, 725 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Rev. Rul. 77-415, 1977-2 C.B. 311, 312.
96. 43 T.C. 313 (1965).
97. Id. at 315-16.
98. Id. at 317.
99. Id. at 322.
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351 nonrecognition and the concomitant step-up in basis of the
target assets under section 334(b)(2).'°° In other words, a tension
inevitably exists where one code section provides nonrecognition
while another provides a total or partial step-up basis. If in Na-
tional Starch the holding company liquidates the target within a
twelve-month period, sections 332 and 334(b)(2) are satisfied and
86% of the target stock will be deemed to be acquired by purchase.
The IRS's conceptual difficulty with a transaction which is simul-
taneously partially tax-free yet subject to a partial basis step-up
apparently is remedied by integrating the section 351 segment into
a larger taxable transaction constituting a purchase.
Yet the benefit of a basis step-up may or may not be an "al-
lowance" under section 269. Assuming step-up in basis is an "al-
lowance," it is nevertheless not an allowance not otherwise
obtainable. The purchaser is statutorily entitled to a step-up in
basis to the extent shares are acquired by purchase and other pro-
visions of section 332 and 334(b)(2) are satisfied. Although the
IRS's evident concern in coupling step-up in basis with a tax-free
transaction is understandable, such concern is irrelevant for pur-
poses of section 269. Control of the holding company is not ac-
quired to achieve these benefits. Thus, however this conceptual
problem is resolved, the application of section 269 is not affected.
Moreover, combination of the two transactions may not be all that
conceptually troublesome for the IRS. In May B. Kass,10' a mi-
nority shareholder received cash for her shares in a non-qualify-
ing reorganization; the remaining shares previously were acquired
in a non-interdependent section 351 exchange. The IRS brief
stated that where minority shareholders recognize gain, the ac-
quiring corporation is entitled to a stepped-up basis in assets "at-
tributable to the stock of the minority shareholders." 102 The IRS
in Kass seemingly validates combining a tax-free and a taxable
transaction by acknowledging that a partially taxable transaction
properly results in a partial basis step-up.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rejection of the National Starch result in Revenue Ruling 80-
284 is primarily based upon a particular application of the inter-
dependent steps doctrine. Accordingly, the section 351 segment of
100. See Bowen, The Reach of Section 351, 59 TAXES 926, 934 (1981).
101. 60 T.C. 218 (1973), aft'd, 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974). See supra notes 46-55 and
accompanying text.
102. 60 T.C. at 225, n. 13.
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the transaction has no independent significance and is subsumed
within a larger transaction characterized as a reorganization ac-
quisition. Under the reorganization provisions, continuity of inter-
est principles require that at least 50% of the consideration be
equity. Since the target majority receives cash for its shares, the
larger reorganization is taxable and subsequently taints the pur-
ported section 351 segment.
However, this characterization of the transaction is inconsis-
tent with the underlying purposes and objectives of the reorgani-
zation provisions and section 351. Although both share a
common statutory origin, each provision clearly contemplates dis-
tinct economic arrangements. Section 351 specifies stringent con-
tinuity of interest rules; the judicially developed reorganization
continuity rules are without statutory origin, and may not require
the degree of continuity the IRS demands. The two transactions
should be separated whenever at least two characterizations of the
same transaction are possible, each with distinct tax consequences.
Similarly, interdependence should not be imposed where those
steps taken serve one or more parties' specific needs which would
not be satisfied by recharacterizing the transaction. Despite the
presence of both features in the National Starch fact pattern, Rev-
enue Ruling 80-284 fails to properly acknowledge the separate
and independent significance of each transaction.
Abuse of section 351 as a tax avoidance technique can be lim-
ited by resurrecting and aggressively applying section 269. Where
section 351 is used in obtaining control of a corporation, unin-
tended tax benefits may qualify as allowances under section 269,
requiring its application. Indeed, if section 351 is the sleeping gi-
ant of Subchapter C awakened to produce mischief, then section
269 is its sleeping nemesis.
EPILOGUE
Section 334(b)(2) was repealed by the recently enacted Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (T.E.F.R.A.) (P.L.
97-248) which contains significant changes in the taxation of do-
mestic corporations and their shareholders. The new provision of
the code permits the acquiring corporation to file an election to
adjust the basis of the acquired company's assets without liquidat-
ing that company. However, the acquired corporation and its tax
attributes will be treated as having been terminated as of the date
that its stock is acquired if this election is filed.
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